WOWcast transcript: Bulcsú Hunyadi

(Podcast published November 18, 2026)

Steve Sachoff: Welcome, Bulcsú  Hunyadi. We’re very happy to have you here on Weight of the World with us. You are the second Hungarian we've been lucky enough to speak with in the past few months. We talked with the opposition, or then opposition, MP Katalin Cseh in the fall, before the April elections, obviously. And this was when Prime Minister Viktor Orbán was still in power in Hungary. With Katalin, we talked about how the opposition was preparing for this election and how it has managed to keep going despite I think it's sixteen years of Orbán's rule and to keep pushing back against this and not get discouraged and to end up with a strategy that they felt like a was a winning hand. 

So, we'll get into all of this when when we talk, but I wanted to start off on a little more personal note and just ask you if you could tell us a bit about yourself and going maybe way back, your life growing up in Hungary, I don't know exactly when you were born, but I believe you straddle the pre-1989 [era] by a few years, and then moving into post-revolutionary Hungary, what was life like as a young person growing up in this kind of dual time period?

Bulcsú Hunyadi: Yeah, thank you so much for having me. It's an honor to be here with you on this podcast. So my name is Bulcsú Hunyadi, and I'm Head of Programs at Political Capital, which is an independent think tank based in Budapest, Hungary. We've been doing research on various political and social issues. Of course we're monitoring and closely following the Hungarian domestic political situation, but also our core topics include research on Russian influence, research on disinformation, research on right-wing extremism and radicalization, and also the influence-building efforts of the international far right or international illiberal movement. So these are the key topics. I've been with the institute since 2007, so for quite a long time.  

I have the privilege, as many others in this sector in Hungary and many other colleagues of mine as well to have survived the last 16 years, which was dominated by Viktor Orbán in Hungary. 

But coming back to the personal side of the question, I was born in 1980, so 10 years before Hungary actually transferred from a communist socialist dictatorship into a democracy. And my very first political memory, I think, is from 1989 or 1990, when I was obviously a schoolboy. We had, I think [it was] sports class in the elementary school, and our teacher asked us to sit down on the floor, and we had to listen to the radio where the interim president of the republic just announced that Hungary is becoming a republic. So a democratic state again. So that was I think my first political memory.  I was obviously a little boy. 

And then of course I had some impressions and memories from the first years of the kind of democratization of Hungary. I turned 18 in 1998. So that was my first election where I participated. Also, I participated in the election on Hungary's accession to NATO, Hungary's accession to the EU. So I think these [events] definitely very much impacted my political consciousness.

These events and this time period…how did you end up where you are today at Political Capital, working on these topics? That is, how did that interest manifest itself or develop?

So I have, I think, a very strong devotion to human rights, equality, and also some social values. So I think all these events starting in the late 1980s, like when Hungary was still under socialist communist governance, the transformation into a democratic system and all the political, you know, discussions and arguments about it, I think these definitely have had an impact on me and formed my consciousness.

I'm curious, how was it working at Political Capital? You said you were there, I don't know when the organization started, but in 2007, [how was it] to be working under the Orbán regime? Did you feel that you personally or the organization, were you pressured or blacklisted? What was it like working under that kind of government?

Viktor Orbán came to power in 2010 in Hungary with a constitutional majority and that was one of the cornerstones or key elements of why and how Viktor Orbán was able to establish an increasingly authoritarian or autocratic system in Hungary, because he had the power and his government had the full power to, you know, rewrite the complete structure of the state in Hungary. And they could rewrite the complete political system in Hungary.

So I think it started pretty early after 2010, when we began feeling that, you know, times are changing and that it will be a completely different era where the government and the state, you know, consider independent actors on a political basis, basically. So the state stopped being neutral towards its citizens and towards any kind of social and political and public actors.

And there was kind of one question which decided, you know, how you were approached by state and also by state officials, and this question was very simple: are you with, or do you support the government or do you criticize the government? And everyone and every organization and every actor that criticized the government for any reason, I think felt very quickly that they are considered enemies of the state. This is also what Political Capital [felt], and we at Political Capital, the team members of Political Capital, also felt. It was mainly, of course, our director, Péter Krekó, who was constantly targeted and attacked by government officials, politicians, and also propagandists, those people who worked in the pro Fidesz media. For different reasons, for various reasons, the main goal was to stigmatise him and also any other actors, again, who criticized the government and who were not, you know, supporting the government actively.

So almost like the pre-1989 days in a way, these organizations like yours almost become a focus of dissent and dissidents in society.

Partly, yes. I mean definitely the main objective of the previous government, of the Orbán government, was to silence every kind of dissent. But I think there obviously was a very important difference between the pre-1990 period and the post-2010 period, which is the difference that you cannot still see like between, you know, hybrid regimes and full-fledged autocracies like Russia or Turkey or North Korea, like physical aggression by state officials or by party people has not or did not happen in Hungary. There were probably a few counter-examples where the regime used physical force to silence dissent, but they did not use physical aggression. And I think this is a crucial difference. So Hungary has never been Russia or has never been in the situation which Turkey is developing into.

Right, that's quite interesting. I was just talking about that with some people, [saying] that never seemed to quite reach that stage [in Hungary], whereas in some countries such as mine you already see, in a short period of time, you know, confrontations, military people, people being taken off the street, this kind of thing. So [there were] definitely some differences. 

But let's go a bit more into this idea of the Orbánization of Hungary, the way that Orbán managed to really cement control over so many aspects of the country in such a complete and total manner without this violence or aggression, as you put it. What in your view were the key pillars of how he managed to do this over time?

I think the key to this was that Viktor Orbán came to power with a two-thirds majority, which is a constitutional majority in the Hungarian legal system. And in the Hungarian legal system that gave the new government and Viktor Orbán the opportunity to fully rewrite the legal order and the political order of the country. So there were no kind of constraints in the system that could have balanced the power of the government or could have checked the power of the government.

And also, the Orbán government strategically and gradually removed all the existing constraints that were previously built into the system and functioned, actually well before 2010. So [from] between 1990 and 2010. I mean, of course there were a lot of problems also before 2010, a lot of corruption issues also with previous governments, a lot of anti-democratic tendencies, but not on the scale that we were observing after 2010. So I think the major milestones in this process of establishing an autocratic system was the overhaul of the judiciary in Hungary or most parts of the judiciary, like the Constitutional Court to begin with, as one of the most important institutions, or within the system of checks and balances. Also, the overhaul of the highest court in the country, the Supreme Court, which is in Hungary different than the - you know, we have Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court, so they're two different courts - the overhaul of the prosecution services, the president of the state audit office, the competition authority, also the the president of the country. So they changed the system [and] how these institutions worked on the one hand, and on the other hand, they also appointed people as leaders of these institutions who were politically loyal, not only to the party, but especially to the prime minister. 

So through, first of all, through legal changes and through informal power, the government and Viktor Orbán managed to silence these institutions or remove again, as I said, to remove the constraints that were built into the system. So that was I think the first and most important step, or one of the most important steps. Then, Viktor Orbán also rewrote the country's political system completely. The parliament passed a new constitution, they also re-wrote the electoral law in Hungary and completely changed the electoral system, [they] also changed the constituencies, so kind of gerrymandered the electoral districts. They strengthened the majoritarian elements in the electoral system. And the result at the end was that the system favored right-wing parties, especially, of course, the governing party and the strongest political force. So they created, actually, an electoral system where it became very hard for the ruling party to lose an election. And this was one of the reasons why it was almost impossible for 16 years for any opposition party to oust the ruling party. 

Another very important aspect was the restructuring of the media system. Many, including us at Political Capital, described the Orbán regime as an “informational autocracy,” by which we stress the importance of the media system, the importance of propaganda and disinformation in Hungary. Viktor Orbán established a system in which the vast majority of news media was actually under the control of the government. It was not only direct control, of course, very often it was informal control. Of course, you know, the government had or controlled the state news agency and the state media, but then private business persons close to the government received money, very often indirect public money, to buy independent media outlets. And then they either closed these media outlets or they transformed these media outlets into government mouth mouthpieces. They also created a network of private media. They also established a network of government-organized political influencers on social media. They poured an unlimited amount of public funding into public and private pro-government media and also into political advertisements on social media. So they really established a system like a disinformation system where the government could disseminate its very biased messages across the public sphere almost without any challenge. And then, and here I will stop I guess and we can dive into some of these aspects later, but I think what I also wanted to stress is the corruption, which has been or was really very important. 

You know regularly or very often, if you talk about corruption, you mean that, you know, private individuals steal public money. In Hungary, the interesting thing was that the corruption was actually organized from the top. So it was not just, you know, private or the undertaking of some private individuals to steal public money. It was actually a central element of the system. It was built up as a funding scheme designed to keep the system going. 

Of course, you know, as as I try to explain what kind of media system the Orbán government created, it required a lot of money to keep this media system going. And there were also other examples why they needed so much money. So I think, you know, maintaining an autocratic system really requires a lot of money. And, you know, to kind of create this money, you need a corruption system.

So given all these things you mentioned, the control of the judiciary, the media, this general top down corruption, how did I Magyar, who won the elections, and his Tisza party, what do you think they did to run successfully against the Orbán regime this time and avoid pitfalls? There have been disappointments in the past - I remember four years ago - there were hopes [of beating Orbán]] and then in the end it wasn't really that close. So what made the difference at a political level? And also, [do you] feel like civil society changed its approach to things, in terms of, between this election and previous ones, did they decide on a different strategy to focus on defeating Orbán at all costs, or did they zero in on a few key issues? How did the political side of the equation win this time and what changed in civil society?

I think it might be not so easy to understand why an election victory for an opposition party became possible after 16 years of an increasingly autocratic system and why previous opposition parties in previous elections were not able to defeat Victor Orbán's party. I think it was first of all a learning curve for the whole society and also for civil society actors and also for opposition parties, to learn how to cope with the system.

I mentioned previously that the Orbán government re-wrote the electoral system completely and also they changed the electoral system a few times during these 16 years. So it's not that they passed a new electoral system in 2011 and then they kind of maintained it or kept it unchanged, but they, from time to time, they kind of polished the system so that it really served their political interests.

So it was a constant learning, I think, for all opposition parties. I think a very important difference between the the last election campaign and all the previous elections is that in this last election campaign there was only one opposition party which obviously had a chance to change the government and to win elections. In previous elections, in the early years, it was also opposition parties fighting each other in elections and also before elections. So there was a competition also among opposition parties, which is, you know, completely normal in a functioning democratic state or in a functioning democracy. This is what competitive democracy is about. However, Victor Orbán created a system, an electoral system, first of all, where it required really one big party to challenge the ruling party. And this was only possible in this last election. 

Also in the previous election, I mean in 2022, opposition parties tried to form an alliance. So, you know, running in the election as a kind of big block against the ruling Fidesz party. But also, this big block in 2022 didn't really function because there was infighting between the opposition parties and also the leadership. The then prime ministerial candidate, I think, you know, was not at the same level as Victor [Orbán]. So he was not a credible and competent challenger. 

So I think these are the things which have changed since 2022 and which created the necessary circumstances to change the government in this last election in 2026.

Of course, very much depended on the challenger, the opposition figure, the opposition candidate Peter Magyar himself and his party, or I think it's better to say his movement, because the party Tisza is [in legal terms] a very small entity. It probably has dozens of members. It's more a broad social movement. 

So Peter Magyar became a credible challenger because first of all, because, and it might sound interesting or might sound strange, but I think he became credible because he was formerly part of the Fidesz system. He was the husband of a former justice minister of Hungary under Viktor [Orbán]. And Peter Magyar at that time when they were married received high-level positions in state-owned companies and agencies because nepotism was a key part and a key element of the system.

So he very well knew how the system worked, and he also had a lot of stories, so he could credibly communicate to people how corruption worked and what corruption looked like in practice. Then, also, Peter Magyar demonstrated political instincts, so he knew how to cope with all the attacks that the propaganda targeted him with. He was proactive in coping with these attacks. And also, and this is what [was] probably one of the most important [things], if not the most important thing, he invested an incredible amount of political work in the campaign. He appeared on the political scene only at the beginning of 2024. So, [just] over two years before the elections. But during these two years, he constantly toured the country almost without any breaks. He visited, I think, over seven hundred localities in Hungary, which is over 20% of all the municipalities we have in Hungary. So he really met a lot of people and [did] incredible work touring the country, organizing events, talking to people, meeting with people, engaging with people and listening to people. And I think this was a novelty in Hungary because I think many people, especially in the rural areas but also in bigger cities, I think were not used to anymore to privately meeting or personally meeting politicians, to have politicians listening to them. So I think this was really a novelty and this made a difference. 

But I think also what set the stage for him and for his political movement was actually the state of the economy and the state of public services, which significantly deteriorated under the Orbán government, especially in the last few years of the Orbán government. Hungary had the highest inflation in the European Union. The Hungarian economy stagnated for years, living costs rose. So there was really a practical feeling in society that things are going wrong and are not going in the right direction. And I think when you feel that your personal economic and social situation is deteriorating, when you experience every day that, you know, the train you use or the roads that you drive on, these are deteriorating from one day to another, in this situation, I think you become much more open to to anti-corruption messages. 

The last point I wanted to say [concerns] Fidesz’s situation itself. The ruling party, after being in power 16 years, I think there was kind of a tiredness among the population, a Fidesz fatigue in the population, and fatigue of also Orbán probably as well, so personally with the prime minister. 

But probably more important was that the government lost its credibility, due to a series of different scandals that shook the government. There were a lot of corruption scandals in recent years, but also there were other types of scandals, not only corruption, which actually broke the core ideological fundamentals of Fidesz and its governance. 

Also, many people in the last months [of the Orbán regime] came forward, also public officials and public servants came forward and [spoke out] publicly, [giving] examples of the systemic abuse of power in state institutions, for instance. So I think these have been the main factors that enabled or allowed the opposition party to win the elections.

We talked a bit about corruption and this being a weak point. I remember some of the extreme stories, I believe, about the zoo that was kept [by Orbán] with zebras and these kind of things. But this is obviously a weak point that is common to a lot of authoritarian dictatorships, authoritarianism, illiberal places. What are some other key things that can be exploited by the opposition? What besides corruption? Are there some shared elements?

Yes, an important thing I haven't mentioned yet is, I mean, I mentioned disinformation and how the regime, I mean the Orbán regime used this information as a pillar of its power to manipulate society and manipulate public discussion and also control public discussion. But I haven't mentioned yet how Peter Magyar actually challenged this disinformation environment and disinformation system. While Fidesz had clear dominance in the public discourse due to its media empire, due to its presence on social media, through the huge amount of money that they invested in political advertising and also in establishing a network of political propagandists or influencers on social media, which I mentioned, they seem to be you know dominating public discussion. And Peter Magyar's solution to this was that he actually walked to the people or or went to the people, went to over seven hundred localities to meet with the people in person, directly. So while at the rhetorical level and in the media, on social media, the government had a clear dominance, slowly and gradually Peter Magyar established his presence in the offline sphere. I think that was very interesting to see. 

And I think what contributed to this was also his messaging and his issues. While the government tried to manipulate society through different disinformation campaigns, Peter Magyar actually managed to to challenge this disinformation and the populism of the government through a different type of populism, which I think many would call a “good populism.” But the main point here is that Peter Magyar focused on people's real concerns or everyday problems. As I mentioned, you know, economic issues, social issues, the state of public services, like healthcare, education, the transport system, and so on and so forth. So so Peter Magyar talked about issues and problems that people in their everyday life experienced while the government was talking about, you know, very symbolic, sometimes also culture of war issues and problems, mainly about the war in Ukraine, about I don't know, suppression by the European Union, by liberal elites, and many other issues like this. 

But there was an increasing gap between the reality that people experienced in their lives and the narratives, disinformation narratives of the government. And Peter Magyar, by focusing on these everyday issues and everyday problems, he managed also to create a link between corruption and people's everyday problems. So he could explain that because of, you know, the zebras in Victor Orbán's private zoo, how these zebras are connected to the deteriorating situation of the public, railway system, for instance, or the hospitals in the country. So I think this was really important in Peter Magyar’s campaign. And I think this is what also maybe could be useful or helpful for other pro-democratic actors in other countries, because very often I have the feeling, which I think also we committed in Hungary, that in the early years of the Orbán government, we very much focused on democracy issues, symbolic issues. I mean, of course not [only] symbolic, because you know the state of democracy is not a symbolic thing. But still for many people, these are not everyday and very tangible problems. And this is, I think, what Peter Magyar successfully changed and successfully managed to cope with. He did not engage with any of this rhetoric or symbolic or issues, even culture war issues, even though of course these were definitely very important for many people in Hungary. I mean practically, like LGBTQ rights for instance. But Peter Magyar consciously kind of stayed away from or did not engage with these issues because he regarded these as kind of traps of the government. So he kept following his own strategy, he kept following his own path, talking about corruption, talking about everyday economic and social issues.

Yeah, that's very interesting. And I think he is such an effective communicator. He was able to create this opposing narrative and connect, as you said, the abstract idea of corruption to the real lives of people. And I think that's something that's not that easy to do. It seems kind of like common sense, but I find that people struggle, politicians struggle to do that often. They'll talk about a lot of these things in the abstract, or get sucked into the cultural war issues and spend time there and then you're already on your opponent's narrative and having to play defense. So that's a very good point that he managed to do that.

There was also an interesting thing parallel to that because it was kind of a snowball effect with Peter Magyar. I think also a very important pillar of Victor Orbán's power for many years was that society and most of the people did not believe that change was possible. And with the emergence of Peter Magyar, more and more people actually believed that, first of all, a change is needed, and second of all, that a change is possible, which created a kind of revolutionary feeling in Hungary, or an atmosphere in Hungary which also enabled more and more people to speak up and to stand for their rights. And also as I mentioned, that public officials came forward and talked publicly about the state of state institutions, for instance, or or the abuse of power. So I think civic courage has become very important in this process of change in Hungary. 

You might have heard about the so-called transparency law, which the Hungarian government, the Orbán government wanted to pass, which was not about transparency, it was about silencing institutions. And they actually wanted to not only silence but [end] the existence of institutions that received public money from abroad, from foreign sources. And also they banned the Pride March last year, in 2025.

And in both cases, in both issues, there was genuine civic opposition also to the so called transparency law and to the pride ban. So people organized demonstrations. We had the biggest ever pride march last year in Hungary, because really hundreds of thousands of people said that this is not okay and and it's not acceptable. And despite the threats of the police and government officials, they just went to the pride march. 

So there was a civic, a bottom-up grassroots civic opposition in the last years of the Orbán government or in the last year of the Orbán government against many things that the government proposed or talked about.

Right. I mean it's a case of overreach in a way. I think [autocrats] become so used to being able to…they ban something, so it won't happen. But people reach a point where they have had enough and the regime is out of touch with this feeling and then  you have this. But you need both things coming together. You need that part of civil society, but you need a leader who can channel that and [knows] what to focus on and then gives people this confidence that it makes a difference to go out and do that. I know people who were at that pride march who came back and said, I mean, it had that real revolutionary feeling to it, and it was something much bigger than one issue. And that kind of carried on into the election period. So yeah, very interesting way to approach things as Hungary did. 

To turn a little bit more broadly, as we mentioned, you're the head of the radicalization and extremism program at Political Capital. And so I wanted to get your views on how developed or entrenched do you think the far-right authoritarian movement is internationally? How deeply rooted this is, and also why was Hungary, a relatively small country of 10 million people, such an important node or point in this network of these movements?

I think it's really interesting to look at and to monitor these networking efforts or the influence [and] building efforts of the far-right organizations, the international efforts of far-right organizations, because you know, traditionally the far right, both ideologically and also organizationally, is actually rooted in the national context. You know, their most important ideology or idea is nationalism. But indeed, in fact, they started becoming more international and started creating or developing an international network in the last, I don't know, decade, probably over a decade already. 

What is very interesting or very important to see is that even though they try to project themselves as if they were, you know, closely united, I think there still are a lot of differences among or within this international movement. So it still consists of national organizations that are still rooted in the national context. So their interests, their talking points and and their policies actually are very often rooted in the national context. They are mainly targeting national audiences. And I think this is the trick in this whole game for them, to create a bridge or to find those issues or find those narratives that they can advance together or that they can promote together. So they very consciously only focus on common topics and shared topics. 

Migration is definitely one of the most important among these topics. In the EU, in the European context, opposition to the centralization of the European Union is also definitely a very important issue. Opposition to the so-called Green Deal, like the green transition, is also a very important issue. 

And I think what is not only European, but more generally, the opposition to alleged curbs on civil liberties is a very important issue. Like, you know, they say that free speech is not allowed anymore. We are oppressed by liberal elites. I think this is also a general issue. But below the surface of these issues, I think there are a lot of differences in many topics. But also I think there are differences within these very topics, where they say that they actually have a common agenda. 

I think also in the details, there are some differences, like how to handle migration, for instance, or what to do with EU centralization. I think in the details, they have different opinions. So they are definitely not as united as they try to project. 

And the reason Hungary became such an important hub for this international [far-right] networking, I think the answer is very easy. This is, I think, the answer to most of the questions about Hungary. This is because Viktor Orbán, with his constitutional majority and constitutional power was able to create an autocratic system in Hungary where the lines between the ruling party and the state were blurred. The ruling party, Fidesz, could also use state money, public money, for its political interests, for its political goals. And I think this was one of the major [things] that made Hungary a very important element in this chain internationally, because Hungary could provide political know-how, practical support and also political support and first of all, money for this international networking. 

The Hungarian state actually created many organizations, like the Matthias Corvinis Collegium, the Danube Institute, the Center for Fundamental Rights, which were funded by public money, Hungarian public money, and they all were very seriously and deeply engaged in establishing international connections, and also provided money for other actors, international actors or also other national actors in their context. They published books, they organized events, they organized meetings, they paid for foreign activists, researchers to come to Hungary to kind of study the Hungarian system, to bring this kind of knowledge to their home and also to promote Hungary, of course. 

And also because Viktor Orbán was in power for 16 years and had ultimate power in Hungary, Hungary also functioned as a kind of policy laboratory for illiberal Ideas.

He also established narratives that seemed to function, at least in Hungary, for many years. And I think it was you know, Hungary could show an example to many actors in many other countries which policies and which narratives may work.

Yeah, just objectively you have to say it's quite an impressive array of organizations and planning that they managed to pull off, again from for a relatively small country, to position itself at the center of that because it is this inherent contradiction of the nationalist interest and then trying to connect cross border and that tension there is maybe what does keep it from becoming even more successful, but they're always refining their ideas and so it's something you have to constantly be watching, it seems.

You've laid out what Hungary did and why it became such an important player in this [far-right] ecosystem. Do you think that Western democracies, and I don't know what you want to call it because it's not necessarily a right or left issue, but democratic societies anywhere, are they aware enough of what was happening at this international level, and are they doing enough themselves to combat that in some way?

That's a good question. I don't know. I'm not sure how aware pro-democracy actors are about what is happening or what happened within the illiberal international as we sometimes call it. You know, we cannot have so much practical information about the meetings and what they actually did. I mean, many of these happenings are not public for obvious reasons. So it's hard to get information and also at least in Hungary,but I think it's increasingly the case also in other countries, many of these gatherings were not accessible to people who were not or are not part of this illiberal movement. And also very often journalists and the press are excluded from these events, even though these should actually very often these should be public events, but there is limited access also for the press to these events. So it's not so easy to follow, I think, what is happening. But also very often you can just kind of guess. based on the activities and the strategies of these organizations, what is happening. 

It's also an interesting learning curve, I guess, because I think the far right, this illiberal movements and actors, I think felt challenged by those actors that they call or consider liberal, and the international network of these so called liberal actors, and they created this international movement as kind of a reaction to this. And I think now we, on the other side, because I think now also pro-democracy actors have to increase their networking activities and have to learn from each other because we also can very clearly see that these illiberal actors learned from each other. I mean what was happening in Hungary was partly invented in Hungary, but also very often, in a few cases, also Viktor Orbán learned from other examples and kind of imported narratives, ideas and also practical actions and policies from other countries. We can see that things that Viktor Orbán did, like the anti-gay propaganda law or the anti-LGBTQ law that was passed in Hungary in 2020 [or] 2021. This example then was taken over by illiberal actors in other countries like Romania, Slovakia, Georgia, very importantly.

So, they definitely learn from each other. I think we also, I mean pro-democracy actors, have to learn from each other as well. I think this is actually happening, but here I think it's really important to know and to understand and to internalize [the fact]  that every national context is different. So what worked in Hungary might not or most probably will not work in other countries, like very directly. But I think this is also a point where illiberal actors can actually fail because I think they are also prone to to think or to believe that what worked in Hungary they can just very easily transfer to Poland for instance or to France or other countries. So you really need to consider that national contexts are very different. 

But still I think there are some kind of general trends or general tactics that you can learn from other actors, like what I said [about] this “good populism” from Peter Magyar, like focusing on practical issues instead of culture wars and symbolic issues, engaging with people, meeting with people, talking and listening to people. I think this is also very important. 

Corruption, as I said, in Hungary corruption was not only important because public money was stolen, it was also important because it actually kept the autocratic system alive and kept the autocratic system going. So if this happens or if it develops in the same way in other countries, it's also important to make people understand why corruption is a problem.

We've talked about the Orbánization of Hungary and how that happened, the key pillars behind that. Many Americans say that the current Trump administration is looking to Hungary, or the Orbán version of Hungary as a model, doing a lot of things that it has learned there, as he said, taking from other places as well, but pulling what they need, what works, and applying it in their own countries. Trump, you know, again, a lot of attention was focused on the leader of this small country. He would personally call out Orbán at campaign rallies in the U.S. It's amazing how many Americans knew the name Viktor Orbán, when they don't know the prime minister of the United Kingdom, but this name was very familiar to a lot of people. The U.S. vice president took the very unusual step of campaigning in Hungary personally, just prior to the election. There are a lot of, at least on the surface, similarities between what's going on in the U.S. right now, and I'm talking here about how they are trying to or are locking in power, and that is through media control, or these sort of deals where you see big legacy media companies being bought by allies of the administration, so not owned outright [by the government] but by people that they obviously have some influence over, just general nepotism, family members or close associates benefiting from these kind of things. And then [there is] just the general corruption, which, a lot of people describe it as corruption on steroids and just unlike anything they've ever seen before. And then transforming the relatively up to now non-political civil service into something that is filled with loyalists and [making it a] more politicized institution. 

I know you're not an expert on U.S. politics or what's going on in the U.S., but as a person studying these movements internationally, are there any things that jump out as red flags in the United States, that have been happening [there] in the past year and a half that you say, that's particularly dangerous or could be, given the Hungarian context?

Yeah, sure. So I think many of [the things] you said sound alarming to my ears, as you know, having experienced this in the last 16 years. So I think taking control of, you know, state administration and using state administration for party political purposes, blurring the lines between party and state definitely, is a very alarming sound[ing]. The restructuring of the media landscape and turning media and independent media outlets into politically biased and party biased especially and controlled mouthpieces is definitely very alarming and very dangerous. 

Of course corruption is bad in itself wherever it happens, because it's stealing of public money, which should be used for the public good. But in terms of corruption, I think a very important question is whether it's systemic. And if systemic corruption is really used for political gains and for political interests. So I would make a difference [distinction] between corruption for private purposes and corruption for political and party power purposes. This latter happened in Hungary, and I think was especially damaging. 

And of course, independence of the judiciary. This also proved to be one of the most important things in Hungary. Taking care of the constitutional court, taking care of the judicial system, taking care of the independence of judges, this is definitely very important.

And I think in general what you said, based on Hungary's experience, I think what really needs to be maintained is the system of checks and balances. In Hungary we had the problem that Victor Orbán had really ultimate power with a constitutional majority. As far as I understand, the American political system is much more complex, because of the states versus the federal administration. So you have much more checks in the system. In Hungary, we did not have that. So if in Hungary you win with the constitutional majority, you can literally do anything that you want nationwide. 

That leads to my last point. It's funny, a lot of our guests are very hesitant when I use the word advice. So I'm gonna say, I'm gonna soften that a bit, but just to ask you a question we ask all of our guests, and that is what guidance or suggestions would you give to people, Americans, or [people] anywhere, in countries that are dealing with extremism, illiberalism, authoritarianism, threats of any of those things, what can the average person who knows there's something wrong but is busy living their life and trying to to get by, what are some concrete things they can do to make a difference?

That's a hard question. Because also in Hungary, you know, for a lot of years, it did not work in Hungary either. So even though there were, you know, a lot of initiatives, civic movements, civil society organizations and other social and and political actors trying to make a difference and trying to oppose the autocratic government in Hungary, it did not work for many years and it required really a political figure who was able to make society believe that change is possible. And [once that happened, it] created this snowball effect that more and more people actually really started believing that it's possible. So I think you really need to have some kind of a light at the end of the tunnel which makes you, you know, more confident and which makes you speak up. I think as long as you don't believe that change is possible, your possibilities I think are very limited. 

But I think what you need to do and what you can do definitely is make a change in your personal environment and create communities, you know, strengthen each other, reinforce each other so that you're not alone with your thoughts and with your ideas and also with your actions. So I think it's important for you personally, mentally, but also as a community to create these communities, to meet other people. 

And I think it's also important to understand people have different ideas, different values or vote differently in elections. You really have to understand these people. In Hungary, we a had very interesting situation in the previous - not in the last election, but in the election [back] in 2022, because there was a movement, a social movement created by civil society organizations. They wanted people to work as election observers in rural areas in Hungary, because [among] the opposition parties there was a concern that the opposition parties would not have enough activists to be present in each polling station. And so civil society actors, civil society organizations recruited a lot of civil activists to work as election observers on election day. And many people, very often from the big cities, from the capital city, Budapest, went to the countryside, to small localities to work there on election day in the polling stations. And it was for most of them, I think, a striking experience to really meet these people in person, who they have never met before because they live in completely different realities, normally. I think for many, it was a striking experience. So I think it's really important to talk to other people and to understand these people because it's very easy to make political statements about people who vote other than you do. But you can make a change, I think, if you really understand the motivations of those people. So that would be a very strong suggestion from my side.

I think that's a good place to end. It makes a lot of sense. I'd just like to say this has been extremely enlightening, so interesting, and I'm so glad you were able to join us, Bulcsú. So thank you very much.

Thank you so much, Steve. It was really an honor for me to be on this podcast with you. Thank you so much for having me.

###

You can listen to this conversation by following Weight of the World on Spotify and Apple. This transcript has been lightly edited for clarity.