Steve Sachoff: I'm very happy that you could join us today, Gabrielius. It's a big honor for us. I would like to start the conversation by setting the stage a bit and ask you if you could tell me about your childhood in Lithuania - you were born in the early 1980s under Russian occupation. I was wondering if you could tell me a little bit about what you remember as a child from that time about your situation, about Lithuania's position in the world and the overall, your feelings from that time.

Gabrielius Landsbergis: Well, yeah, so first of all, you're absolutely right. I was born in what was then the occupied Lithuania, part of the Soviet Union. You know, my family probably was a bit now, in retrospect, I believe that it [my family situation] has been a bit different. So that means that we would have, I had more of a chance to talk about the occupation, life before the occupation, what it means to be free and, you know, what...what is out there waiting for us if we would ever rejoin the West, than probably some other families. [This was] mainly because both my parents and their families were in the circles of people who would usually talk about [Lithuanian] independence. So I was growing up knowing about the deportations, about Stalin's regime and all the other things.

Then, closer to the 1990s, I had a very good vantage point, a very specific vantage point to the whole independence movement, since my grandfather became one of the leaders of it. And so I would participate in the rallies because my parents would take me, even though I was young, barely, not even 10 years old, but I remember sitting on my mom's shoulders or my dad's shoulders and seeing my grandfather somewhere far away giving a speech. And there are thousands of people gathered and they're chanting Free Lithuania or something like that. So that has been - this end of the empire and the beginning of the free Lithuania -  has been intertwined in my early years as something that has happening around me. 

Now, I'm actually, you know, this summer, I started heavily writing my book, and part of it is about my childhood. So I had a chance to reflect a little bit on what I've seen. And now I'm kind of having the thought that it's pretty unique. I mean, it's pretty unique, taking this, you know, having this possibility to sit in the front row where the change was happening.

So that clearly has shaped your world outlook, I mean, both your father and your grandfather and this prominent family active in these [pro-democracy, free Lithuania] circles. The other thing I wanted to ask you about is when the US first appeared on your personal radar screen, so to speak. When you started thinking about it and what you were thinking about it at the time - was it an important place for you, or was it sort of in the background? How did you view it? 

That was, you know, extremely important. So my father was involved in this folklore ensemble, like group, you know, that would travel Lithuania and make recordings of older people still living in villages and singing old Lithuanian songs. So basically the whole Perestroika thing allowed these things to happen. And they're full of Lithuanian mythology, full of Lithuanian history. And you can imagine all those young students bringing back all this knowledge from the villages that have been kept there for decades of occupation. So, young people in the universities, they gathered together and they started singing these songs. And it became part of its own movement. So there were parallel movements - dissidents, politicians, future politicians. And then there were these student groups that would just sing songs. And they were also part of an independence movement. I think it was 1987 or 1988 when for the first time this folklore group had a chance, was allowed to travel to the United States to give a concert to Lithuanian emigres in the United States. So in Chicago, Baltimore and other clusters of where Lithuanians were situated after the Second World War. And we were just recently talking about this, you know, about, you know, how the world looked like. And you can imagine, right? So I'm, you know, what, six, seven years old and, you know, my father comes back and he brings jeans, sneakers, I believe a Nintendo game or something like that. And he tells all those stories about the world, you know, on the other side. And clearly the story for a child, you know, that young has been like, you would tell about a different planet, like literally where everything is available, where people are completely different from anything that you see. And that was the image of the United States that I first got. 

Then growing up, I mean, it [the U.S.] was always not in the periphery, but I would say even at the center of understanding where our concept of freedom is coming from, what are we striving for. When my grandfather, already as a leader of independence movement in Lithuania, traveled to the United States to address the Senate and to meet with representatives there, and he came back and I remember one of the things that he brought back with him, just a silly thing, he brought these night shoes. I don't know whether people would wear it, but it's kind of the thing that you would….slippers, but you would wear, you know, before going to bed. And they had, so on your left, you know, shoe, slipper, there would be Nancy Reagan and on the right, Ronald Reagan, kind of sleeping, right? That, you know, dolls or whatever. And I was so shocked. Like this is the president of the United States and his spouse, and you have them where…on your slippers? And that's okay. And I remember him saying, yeah, I mean, you can basically do whatever. I mean, you can make jokes, you can make fun. And nobody can harm you because of that. So that kind of, again, struck me as something that's very, very different. 

Again, but that's talking about childhood and then growing up. And there was always [also] the more mature understanding as to how important the United States have been in the process of our independence, regaining our independence and the whole free world basically revolved around understanding that the United States is central in this. 

During this time, you're in your teens, you're a young adult, were there any specific American figures, either cultural or political or otherwise, that you sort of looked to especially or was a point of inspiration? 

Well, you know, I've seen all the movies of the 1990s that I could get my hands on. Well, I have to admit that we did not have a lot of chance to watch them legally. So that was a process of trying to see those movies. I remember, you know, my mom would take me to see the first Star Wars movies when they were shown. So actually, that was much later than they actually appeared in the theaters. But we already had a chance to legally see them in the cinema. The way it worked [was] that, you know, some of my friends, you know, some of the people would have the VCRs. And that was extremely rare, to have them. So I had a few acquaintances,they had brought them either from Germany or from the United States. And they would get their hands on, I don't know in what way, and they would say, well, I have the latest Batman movie. And it was like 1994. And then you would have all the children from the whole street gathering in the apartment, you know, bunkering down in one room, and in this tiny TV screen, you know, flickering with a, most often, with a Russian voiceover that makes the movie barely understandable. And you would watch Batman and think, wow, this is crazy, crazy interesting and crazy good. Probably the pop culture made a, also, I mean, to any teenager, to any person growing up, it still does something. But back then, imagine the contrast of gray, dull, just out of Soviet life that you would see out of your window and then this glamorous thing that you would see on your TV, even though it's all flickering and very bad quality, but still. 

So to jump ahead a little bit, you became more more involved in politics. You were an MEP in the European Parliament. And then in 2020, I know there were other things in between then, but it's when you assumed your position as the foreign minister of Lithuania, where you served a four-year term. And it's, I think, fair to say, at least to people who knew you, that's sort of when you became known for this values-based approach to foreign policy, values-driven approach. I'm curious how you feel that approach today works when confronted with current American foreign policy, which is so transactional, chaotic, and really doesn't seem to have any, at least public, dimension, values-related dimension. How does that approach coexist or succeed today?

I mean, in its essence, the approach or at least my attitude towards the approach has not changed. I believe that small countries have a very limited ability to survive in the very realist transactional world. Because if it comes to paying your way through or bribing or even fighting your way through to your survival, I mean, power does matter.

Right? So at the end, what keeps us existing or should sustain our existence is basically just, you know, a set of rules. This is, you know, what we base our existence on. This is what any other small country bases their existence on. If your country is just like Lithuania, you know, which is trying to preserve its language, thousands of years of language, of culture, of history, its people and economic progress and, you know, the political system, whatever, well, there is very little that we can offer apart from just a narrative. Why it is important for a nation like mine to retain its independence. So I believe that, four years ago, I believed that when I started working as a minister, I believed that before, and I continue to believe that now. 

What changed is that I'm more worried about where the world is headed. That has been changing throughout the last year, this year, where I'm really not certain how all of this is going to play out. And probably the first on the table is Ukraine. This is where we see a live experiment on a living nation is being performed. And clearly they are much stronger militarily than Putin has thought them to be, that many of us thought them to be. And that is what keeps them in the fight, that's what keeps them alive. But the way that these greater powers are working around the issue, so-called, will be an example of what others can expect. And therefore, I retain my argument that despite what is being put on the table, despite all the arguments that seem rational now, that what people are trying now to find, figure out the way to how to appease President Trump and how to...be on his better side. I still believe that we have to remind and then continue fighting for, you know, for this values- based approach, because that's at the end, in the end, that will be what will define whether we retain our freedom or not. 

Can you just briefly explain why an average American should be concerned about the fate of Ukraine? 

It's a litmus test of Western power, I would say, you know, I based my concept, my thinking on the involvement of Ukraine in the Western society, which has manifested itself probably at the peak of manifestation was in 2008, where you would probably say that Europe and the United States have been at the broadest of their power, giving promise to Ukraine that they would one day join EU and NATO, starting on the negotiations or least acceptance plans, how that would work. So that was the peak of Western power.

Now, we're being challenged everywhere. France is being challenged in Africa, basically squeezed out of there. Europe is basically challenged almost everywhere where it has been. But the same goes for the United States. It's also the United States’ power that is being challenged. And if Ukraine is let go, then the challenges will not cease, they will continue. And the isolationist policy will not become a choice. It will become a reality that is forced on the United States. Basically, the lines will be drawn not by President Trump, not by the Western powers, but they will be drawn by others, by Putin first of all, and then by Xi and then whoever thinks that they will need some lines. 

So clearly, now is the battle of redrawing. the extent of the Western liberal order. And yeah, I mean, the welfare of the United States very much depends on that order, you know, because where the rules that are adhered [to] comes value, comes trade, and comes so many other things. In the new reality, already, you know, China is proving a very difficult, almost impossible negotiating partner to this new administration. If we see what they are doing now with the trade conversation, negotiations, war, whatever, basically they have an enormous leverage already. And I believe that this is still [just] the beginning of this new world. And if we can reverse that, if we can push back, if we can help Ukraine, that means that we still have power enough to say the way that the world will look like in upcoming years. 

And just continuing on from that a bit and talking about these changes since the new administration has come into office in Washington. What key ways do you think the relationship has changed, maybe temporarily, maybe permanently, for Lithuania and for Europe more broadly in this transatlantic relationship? 

Well, think that some things have been changed, are being changed rather fundamentally. And the biggest victim here is trust. The question that is being asked in the meeting rooms across Europe is, where does the United States stand on European security? I mean, I'm not going into the discussion about, you know, the European freeloading. That's been discussed, and I think that most of the Europeans admit that, look, you know, we did not do right by the United States, we should have been spending more. Right. So there's no debate about this in Europe. But the question is, OK, so we are going to spend more. We are already spending more, at least, you know, those who feel more under pressure or under threat. Whether that means that United States is as ironclad when it comes to European defense as it was previously or has that changed? The question has not been answered. And many point to the example, look, I mean, what is happening now with Ukraine? People will say, okay, but Ukraine is on NATO and NATO is NATO. So there are different approaches, but would we believe that in case Lithuania is attacked, the United States would bring all its military might to assist a small country, or it would send Witkoff to Moscow [Editorial note: Steve Witkoff is the Trump administration’s special envoy for peace missions.] And even the thing that I'm posing this question tells you that there is this question. 

It's always difficult to get inside anyone's head, but just from your vantage point and closeness to Russia and as an observer of what's going on there, how do you think Putin views this administration at the moment? Does he feel like he's in a stronger position than he was six months ago? 

Yeah, I think that he is. I think that he has found a way to manage the administration. He's putting enormous pressure on Ukraine. He's seeing that Ukrainians are not getting the equipment that they require. And now there is some change, right? So that there is some changes. But basically, I think that Putin has calculated that in. And he's playing for time. We've seen that game since February. There is some sort of at least tough talk from Washington. Then there is a meeting. And then there is either more pressure on Ukraine or just more time to Putin.

And it goes over [and over]. So, now again, I think that we're in the seventh episode of that or eighth episode of that, which is pretty similar. I'm really, if somebody would give us a dollar or a euro when everybody says, wow, you know, Trump has changed his position on Putin. Well, we all would be with a handful of euros. You know, I don't think that, in essence, anything has changed since his last, you know, the first announcements, basically the way that he sees the conflict.

If we look at the rising, I think that's fair to say, rising authoritarian trend, some people are using even stronger language, since Trump's election. But Americans have seen a variety of things, from very clear attacks on universities, on judges, on the press. And then we've seen a draconian immigration policy put in place, where people are being literally grabbed off the street in some cases by people in masks and shipped to third countries or prisons in the US without any due process. And then we've seen on the trade front this kind of use of trade policy as a weapon against traditional allies like Canada and Europe, as you mentioned, and many other countries. I'm curious from your point of view, as someone with firsthand experience in a country that has lived under repression, under authoritarian rule, how much of this is familiar to you, and what are the biggest red flags that you are seeing when you are observing from a distance what's happening in the US?

Well, there is a lot of difference. Under occupation, it's a different world out there. But the trend is worrying. We've always been led to believe that there are so many checks and balances, so that the system would always find a way to rebalance itself. If there's pressure on one side, something will rise up to challenge that, that rise. And throughout this half a year, a bit more than half a year, we have not seen that. That is probably the most worrying trend, that the legislature is unable to challenge the administration. Either it's scared or it's worried or it's complacent or it's, you know, benefit seeking, whatever. I mean, but it's unable. The judiciary now, again, is under pressure.

So all that remains is academia, [but this] is also under pressure, and just civil society and the press. So, and these have been holding up. So, I mean, it is worrying, but it's not lost, clearly. And I have a sense that President Trump is also sensing these changes, right? Or [sensing] possible new pressures, pressures on the administration, where they can come from. And in some cases, you see that at least again, seeing that from further out, the steps back are being taken, at least in the rhetoric, some things are not going all way through. 

I think that the biggest, we talked a little bit about this, the biggest damage is done to the image, the way that the United States is perceived. I remember, and we talked about this at the beginning of our conversation, the way that in 1992, 1994, 1990, the way that we've seen young people in Europe, we've seen the United States. It was, you know, there wasn't a better country. You would do anything to travel, you would do anything to study, you would do anything to live there. And I think that this is changing dramatically. This is changing, and I see that even, you know, talking with the younger generation, my kids or their friends. To study in the United States - people think twice whether they really want to do that. Live? Hmm, also different. And that's a loss. That's a loss. 

In many cases, China is actually the victor in this. Offering and suggesting something, giving ideas, and now even with that enormous control over the social media. Globally, they're able to introduce narratives that further diminish Western appeal and actually start raising communist Chinese appeal, suggesting that they are the creator of the new world, which might be more interesting. So when I heard that, a young person was talking to me and he said, we talked about traveling. And he said, “one of the countries that I'd like to travel to is China.” And I'm like, why China? Wow. “I mean, they're so amazing. You know, they're all over TikTok,” [this young person said.]  I'm like, my gosh. This was not on my bingo card. 

On your website, there's a great first sentence about you. It says under your “about me” section, it just says, hello, I'm Gabriel Landsbergis and I refuse to deescalate. You actually have a podcast yourself called Escalation. And recently, you co-authored a major op-ed piece with Garry Kasparov, where you argue that Europe's future depends maybe at this point more on confrontation than cooperation. So just taking those viewpoints into account or that approach, I wanted to ask you, how do you evaluate the domestic opposition in the US at the moment to these changes, this rising authoritarianism, has it surprised you in any sense? Do you feel that there needs to be more confrontation there? And do feel that the opposition, the Democrats, civically engaged people, are doing enough, given what's at stake?

Well, that's a sensitive subject. I mean, in geopolitics, it's easier to talk about this. So, why I use the word escalation, it was a challenge to do three years of de-escalation everywhere we went. And basically, you know, we proved that our strategy, the Western strategy, the only thing that we can do effectively is to de-escalate and try to prevent the war, you know, growing larger, even if it grew larger. And with every passing day that we de-escalated, the Russians escalated. They escalated in Ukraine, they escalated in the West with, you know, so-called hybrid attacks and so many other things. So, basically, you know, my logic was always that we allowed them to do that with our policy. And de-escalation is a wrong and failed policy. And actually, I know it sounds provocative, but basically we need to escalate. At least we need to show the power that we have. And if we don't have it, we need to grow it, right? Because we have the ability. Or if we don't do that, we might [be] doom[ed] to fall. 

Now, when it comes to domestic US politics…I know I've sat in a conversation with some Democratic senators [who] I respect a lot. I worked with them during my years as a minister. And I wasn't the one challenging them. There were people in the room who challenged them, asking, so where are Democrats? We all agreed that the situation is suboptimal. The reaction was really harsh. So it is clear that it is very sensitive. And I really don't understand why. I mean, I could tell that as an observer, just as an observer, not a politician anymore, right? So I left politics more than a half a year ago. I feel as if there is no opposition in the United States, as if there's no different political line of thought. But maybe it's just me. Maybe that's because I'm far away. But at least for many people in Europe, observing and caring about the future of the United States, it seems that people have become more quiet. 

For my last official question that I want to make sure we cover, it's a question we're asking all of our guests. That is, Americans have, for better or worse, been happy to give advice to people around the world on all kinds of topics. But now the tables have turned a bit. And so we're asking people, as an engaged citizen, as someone familiar again with repression and Russia and all of these things, opposition movements. What advice do you have for Americans who are concerned, confused, unsure what to do? What can you maybe tell them, either broadly or narrowly, to help them feel better and to maybe focus on something positive to help defend democracy?

You know, first of all, when I would talk about sentiments, and I'm really glad that the way that you pose your initial questions was about where was the United States when I was growing up, when Lithuania was refinding its freedom. And I want to stress that there is a huge sentiment when it comes to the United States. There are so many people who do care, who do think, who want to work and fight for the right things together with the United States. Nobody wants to walk away. Nobody wants to turn their back. And you know, the United States for decades has been central in our geopolitical world. And then we would like that to continue. So, when people start looking inwards and more, know, and this because the isolation is, you know, comes in the minds of people at the beginning, right? So we don't care. Nobody else cares…So Europe cares, really, and wants to work, and as I said, wants to fight the enemies of freedom together. So that is my message, and it has always been my message that, as Churchill said, “the only thing that is worse than fighting together with partners is fighting without the partners,” right? I think that was the quote. Yeah, so let's not stay alone. on either side of the Atlantic. 

All right, well, I really, really appreciate you joining us, giving us your time. It's an honor and a big thrill, actually, to talk to you. 

Thank you so much. 

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You can listen to this conversation by following Weight of the World on Spotify and Apple. This transcript has been lightly edited for clarity.